Cryptanalysis of some first round CAESAR candidates

Alizadeh, J.; Aref, M. R.; Bagheri, N.; Sadeghi, H.

doi:10.22042/isecure.2016.7.2.5

Cryptanalysis of some first round CAESAR candidates

Document Type : Research Article

Authors

J. Alizadeh ¹

M. R. Aref ²

N. Bagheri ³

H. Sadeghi ⁴

¹ Faculty and Research Center of Communication and Information Technology, Imam Hossein University, Tehran, Iran.

² Information Systems and Security Lab (ISSL), Sharif University of Technology, Tehran, Iran.

³ The Electrical Engineering Department of Shahid Rajaee Teachers Training University, Tehran, Iran.

⁴ Department of Mathematics, Faculty of Science, University of Qom, Qom, Iran.

https://doi.org/10.22042/isecure.2016.7.2.5

Abstract

ΑΕS _ CMCCv₁, ΑVΑLΑNCHEv₁, CLΟCv₁, and SILCv₁ are four candidates of the first round of CAESAR. CLΟCv₁ is presented in FSE 2014 and SILCv₁ is designed upon it with the aim of optimizing the hardware implementation cost. In this paper, structural weaknesses of these candidates are studied. We present distinguishing attacks against ΑES _ CMCCv₁ with the complexity of two queries and the success probability of almost 1, and distinguishing attacks on CLΟCv₁ and SILCv₁ with the complexity of Ο (2^n/2) queries and the success probability of 0.63, in which n is bit length of message blocks. In addition, a forgery attack is presented against ΑVΑLΑNCHEv₁ which requires only one query and has the success probability of 1. The attacks reveal weaknesses in the structure of these first round candidates and inaccuracy of their security claims.

Keywords

Authenticated Encryption

CAESAR

ΑES _ CMCCv₁

ΑVΑLΑNCHEv₁

CLΟCv₁

SILCv₁

Distinguishing Attack

Forgery Attack

20.1001.1.20082045.2015.7.2.5.8

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