Document Type : Research Article
Authors
School of Electrical and Computer Engineering, College of Engineering,University of Tehran, Tehran, Iran
Abstract
The growing popularity of the fabless manufacturing model and the resulting threats have increased the importance of Logic locking as a key-based method for intellectual property (IP) protection. Recently, machine learning (ML)-based attacks have broken most existing locks by exploiting structural traces or undoing optimizations that obfuscate them. A common limitation of these attacks, however, is their reliance on the correlation between the locked circuit structure and the correct key value. In this paper, we introduce structural fuzzing as a simple, nondeterministic, non-optimizing heuristic algorithm that can obfuscate the lock against learning-based attacks, preventing the attacker from predicting the key. We proceed to apply structural fuzzing to multiplexer-based logic locking and propose HyLock, a logic lock with improved resilience against learning-based attacks. In common benchmarks, when compared with a state of the art logic lock, there is on average a 17% decrease in the number of correctly predicted key bits.
Keywords
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