Mansoureh Labafniya; Shahram Etemadi Borujeni
Abstract
There are many different ways of securing FPGAs to prevent successful reverse engineering. One of the common forms is obfuscation methods. In this paper, we proposed an approach based on obfuscation to prevent FPGAs from successful reverse engineering and, as a result, Hardware Trojan Horses (HTHs) insertion. ...
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There are many different ways of securing FPGAs to prevent successful reverse engineering. One of the common forms is obfuscation methods. In this paper, we proposed an approach based on obfuscation to prevent FPGAs from successful reverse engineering and, as a result, Hardware Trojan Horses (HTHs) insertion. Our obfuscation method is using ConFiGurable Look Up Tables (CFGLUTs). We suggest to insert CFGLUTs randomly or based on some optional parameters in the design. In this way, some parts of the design are on a secure memory, which contains the bitstream of the CFGLUTs so that the attacker does not have any access to it. We program the CFGLUTs in run-time to complete the bitstream of the FPGA and functionality of the design. If an attacker can reverse engineer the bitstream of the FPGA, he cannot detect the design because some part of it is composed of CFGLUTs, which their bitstream is on a secure memory. The first article uses CFGLUTs for securing FPGAs against HTHs insertion, which are results of reverse engineering. Our methods do not have any power and hardware overhead but 32 clock cycles time overhead.
Sh. Zamanzadeh; A. Jahanian
Abstract
Fab-less business model in semiconductor industry has led to serious concerns about trustworthy hardware. In untrusted foundries and manufacturing companies, submitted layout may be analyzed and reverse engineered to steal the information of a design or insert malicious Trojans. Understanding the netlist ...
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Fab-less business model in semiconductor industry has led to serious concerns about trustworthy hardware. In untrusted foundries and manufacturing companies, submitted layout may be analyzed and reverse engineered to steal the information of a design or insert malicious Trojans. Understanding the netlist topology is the ultimate goal of the reverse engineering process. In this paper, we propose a netlist encryption mechanism to hide the interconnect topology inside an IC. Moreover, new special standard cells (Wire Scrambling cells) are designed to play the role of netlist encryption. Furthermore, a design ow is proposed to insert the WS-cells inside the netlist with the aim of maximum obfuscation and minimum overhead. It is worth noting that this mechanism is fully automated with no need to detail information of the functionality and structure of the design. Our proposed mechanism is implemented in an academic physical design framework (EduCAD). Experimental results show that reverse engineering can be hindered considerably in cost of negligible overheads by 23% in area, 3.25% in delay and 14.5% in total wire length. Reverse engineering is evaluated by brute-force attack, and the learned information is 0% and the Hamming distance is approximately 50%.
M. Vosoughi; A. Jahanian
Abstract
Nowadays, bulk of the designers prefer to outsource some parts of their design and fabrication process to the third-part companies due to the reliability problems, manufacturing cost and time-to-market limitations. In this situation, there are a lot of opportunities for malicious alterations by the off-shore ...
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Nowadays, bulk of the designers prefer to outsource some parts of their design and fabrication process to the third-part companies due to the reliability problems, manufacturing cost and time-to-market limitations. In this situation, there are a lot of opportunities for malicious alterations by the off-shore companies. In this paper, we proposed a new placement algorithm that hinders the hardware Trojan insertion or simplifies the detection process in existence of Trojans. Experimental results show that the proposed placement improves the Trojan detectability of the attempted benchmarks against Trojan insertion more than 20% in reasonable cost in delay and wire length.