Keywords = CHILOW

Integral Attack on CHILOW

Articles in Press, Corrected Proof, Available Online from 19 March 2026

https://doi.org/10.22042/isecure.2026.242054

Akram Khalesi, Zahra Ahmadian

Abstract CHILOW is a family of tweakable block ciphers introduced at Eurocrypt 2025, prioritizing decryption speed over encryption speed. This is achieved through a low-latency non-linear layer of degree two within the round function and a minimal number of rounds. As a result, CHILOW presents an appealing target for attacks that exploit its algebraic properties. These characteristics, along with the strict query limitations imposed by the designers, motivate our investigation into CHILOW’s security against integral attacks leveraging the division property. We have identified several integral distinguishers, which vary in data complexity and the number of balanced output bits. Specifically, for CHILOW-(32+τ), we derived a 4-round distinguisher with 15 constant bits in the input, in which all the 32 output bits are balanced. However, the longest integral distinguisher that complies with query limitations extends up to 3 rounds. For CHILOW-40, integral distinguishers up to 5 rounds are detected; however, only those spanning three rounds meet the query constraints. Furthermore, we have explored the potential for extending these distinguishers to key-recovery attacks and analyzed their complexity. Using the 3-round distinguisher on CHILOW-(32+τ), we propose key recovery attack with a 32-bit advantage, data complexity of 240 chosen ciphertexts and time complexity of 240 decryptions, all within the query limits. Therefore, by performing an exhaustive search over the remaining key candidates, a single candidate for the master key can be recovered, resulting in an overall attack time complexity of 296 decryptions. Additionally, we present an integral key-recovery attack on the 6-round version of CHILOW-(32+τ) with a data complexity of 28 chosen ciphertexts and a time complexity of 2102.6 encryptions. This attack only obtains information from the tweaks of the last three rounds, and using this information to recover the master key will be the subject of future research.