The ISC International Journal of Information Security

Abstract In this paper, we want to investigate classical-quantum multiple access wiretap channels (CQ-MA-WTC) under one-shot setting. In this regard, we analyze the CQ-MA-WTC using a simultaneous position-based decoder for reliable decoding and using a newly introduced technique to decode securely. Also, for the sake of comparison, we analyze the CQ-MA-WTC using Sen’s one-shot joint typicality lemma for reliable decoding. The simultaneous position-based decoder tends to a multiple hypothesis testing problem. Also, using convex splitting to analyze the privacy criteria in a simultaneous scenario becomes
problematic. To overcome both problems, we first introduce a new channel that can be considered as a dual to the CQ-MA-WTC. This channel is called a point-to-point quantum wiretap channel with multiple messages (PP-QWTC). In the following, as a strategy to solve the problem, we also investigate and analyze quantum broadcast channels (QBC) in the one-shot regime.

Abstract In this paper, we want to derive achievable secrecy rate regions for quantum interference channels with classical inputs under a one-shot setting. The main idea to this end is to use the combination of superposition and rate splitting for the encoding scheme and construct a decoding scheme based on simultaneous decoding.

Abstract Nowadays Radio Frequency Identification (RFID) systems have appeared in lots of identification and authentication applications. In some sensitive applications, providing secure and confidential communication is very important for end-users. To this aim, different RFID authentication protocols have been proposed, which have tried to provide security and privacy of RFID users. In this paper, we analyze the privacy of two recently proposed RFID authentication protocols in 2012 and 2013. We present several traceability attacks including traceability, backward traceability and forward traceability against the first protocol. We also show that, the second protocol not only suffers from Denial-of-Service (DoS) attack, but also it is vulnerable to traceability and backward traceability attacks. We present our privacy analysis based on a well-known formal RFID privacy model which has been proposed by Ouafi and Phan in 2008. Then, in order to overcome the weaknesses, we apply some modifications on these protocols and propose two modified versions.