The ISC International Journal of Information Security

Abstract This paper analyses the security and efficiency of some notable privacy preserving data aggregation schemes, SP2DAS, 3PDA, and EPPA. For SP2DAS and 3PDA schemes, We show that despite the designers’ claims, there are efficient forgery attacks on the signature scheme used. We present a
selective forgery attack on the signature scheme of SP2DAS in the key-only attack model and a selective forgery attack on the 3PDA’s signature scheme in the known-message attack model,
requiring only two pairs of message-signature. These attacks enable the attacker to inject any arbitrary faulty data into the data aggregated by the network, without being detected, which is a serious threat to the performance of the whole network.
We also present an improved version of the broadcast encryption scheme used in EPPA scheme, in which the decryption key is half, the decryption complexity is half, and the ciphertext size is 3=4 of the original one. The semantic security of the proposed scheme is proved under the same assumption as the original scheme.

Abstract An AES-like lightweight block cipher, namely Zorro, was proposed in CHES 2013. While it has a 16-byte state, it uses only 4 S-Boxes per round. This weak nonlinearity was widely criticized, insofar as it has been directly exploited in all the attacks on Zorro reported by now, including the weak key, reduced round, and even full round attacks. In this paper, using some properties discovered by Wang et al. we present new differential and linear attacks on Zorro, both of which recover the full secret key with practical complexities. These attacks are based on very efficient distinguishers that have only two active S-Boxes per four rounds. The time complexities of our differential and linear attacks are 2^55.40 and 2^45.44 and the data complexity are 2^55.15 chosen plaintexts and 2^45.44 known plaintexts, respectively. The results clearly show that the block cipher Zorro does not have enough security against differential and linear attacks.