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Lightweight Cryptographic S-Boxes Based on Efficient Hardware Structures for Block Ciphers

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ABSTRACT

In this paper, we present four low-cost substitution boxes (S-boxes) including two 4-bit S-boxes called S_1 and S_2 and two 8-bit S-boxes called SB_1 and SB_2, which are suitable for the development of lightweight block ciphers. The 8-bit SB_1 S-box is constructed based on four 4-bit S-boxes, multiplication by constant 0x2 in the finite field $\mathbb{F}_{2^4}$, and field addition operations. Also, the proposed 8-bit S-box SB_2 is composed of five permutation blocks, two 4-bit S-boxes S_1 and one 4-bit S-box S_2, multiplication by constant 0x2, and addition operations in sequence. The proposed structures of the S-box are simple and low-cost. These structures have low area and low critical path delay. The cryptographic strength of the proposed S-boxes is analyzed by studying the properties of S-box such as Nonlinearity, Differential uniformity (DU), Strict avalanche criterion (SAC), Algebraic degree (AD), Differential approximation probability (DAP), and Linear approximation probability (LAP) in SAGE. The hardware results, in 180 nm CMOS technology, show the proposed S-boxes are comparable in terms of security properties, area, delay, and area×delay with most of the famous S-boxes.

1 Introduction

In recent years, the cryptographic computations have progressively been implemented on smaller and smaller devices. The traditional cryptography is not always precisely well-studied to the needs of this important subject. Lightweight cryptography such as lightweight block ciphers focuses to address this by designing algorithms that are implementable on constrained devices. Many lightweight block ciphers have been proposed in order to reduce the costs of hardware consumption. Block ciphers are used for data protection in the cryptosystems as a good candidate for resource constraints cryptographic applications. In the last few years, a number of lightweight block ciphers for hardware implementation of the cryptosystems have been proposed and widely used for confidentiality. These cryptographic primitives have been an important area of cryptographic researches [1]-[4]. The most common and complex sub-block in the block ciphers is the substitution box (S-box). This sub-block takes a n-bit data in input and returns a m-bit data at the output. Most of the block ciphers use the 8-bit S-box that maps an 8-bit word to another 8-bit data. However, in block ciphers designed for lightweight applications, S-boxes are commonly 4-bit. The S-boxes have a direct impact on hardware consumption and critical path delay of a block cipher. Therefore, an S-box with an efficient structure is a key sub-block in determining implementation perfor-

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mance.

The focus of this paper is the design of efficient and lightweight hardware structures for the 8-bit and 4-bit S-boxes. The S-boxes used in block ciphers must have good cryptographic properties and low-cost hardware structure. Therefore, designing an S-box which minimizes the area consumption and critical path delay is crucial for obtaining competitive results. The security of proposed S-boxes is analyzed based on standardized security parameters such as Nonlinearity, Differential uniformity (DU), Strict avalanche criterion (SAC), Algebraic degree (AD), Differential approximation probability (DAP), and Linear approximation probability (LAP) by SAGE [22] and [30]. Also, the critical path delay and area consumption of the structures are achieved in 180 nm CMOS technology. The results show that the proposed structures have reasonable hardware resources, timing characteristics, and security properties compared to the other works. The contributions of this paper are summarized as follows:

- We use the substitution-permutation network (SPN) and MISTY networks, and select 4-bit S-boxes with a low-cost implementation that provide good cryptographic properties of the resulting 8-bit S-box.
- Two 8-bit S-boxes based on 4-bit S-boxes, multiplication by constant 0x2 in the finite field $\mathbb{F}_{2^4}$, field additions, and permutation blocks are designed. The 8-bit S-boxes have lower hardware resources and lower critical path delay (CPD) than those of other 8-bit S-boxes.
- Security analysis of the proposed S-boxes shown that the structures have an reasonable security level compared to the other works. Therefore, these structures can be used in the lightweight block ciphers.
- The inverse of the proposed S-boxes have similar structures to the original S-box structures.

The rest of the paper is organized as follows. Preliminaries and cryptanalytic properties for S-boxes are presented summarily in Section 3. Section 4 the proposed structures of S-box are described. Section 5 shows a comparison between our works and related works. Finally, the paper is concluded in Section 6.

2 Related Works

Several S-boxes have been reported in [5]-[21]. In the literature, there are many S-box construction methods such as inversion mapping, power polynomial, heuristic methods, and pseudorandom methods [5]. The inversion mapping S-box consists of simple algebraic expression, thus the S-box design is completed by adding an affine transformation before the input of the S-box, or after the output of the S-box or both in order to make the overall S-box description more complex in a finite field. For some constrained environments, the cost of this approach might be too high. Therefore, the large area consumed is the main drawback of this method. The field inversion is complex to perform in $\mathbb{F}_{2^8}$, so in order to simplify, composite field arithmetic is used by some researchers. The main drawback of the composite field method is greater power consumption, but the delay is much less compared to the architectures which are directly implemented in $\mathbb{F}_{2^8}$. In [6] a cyclic group C_{255} in the formation of proposed S-box is used. In [7] a chaotic S-box based on the intertwining logistic map and bacterial foraging optimization is designed. In [8] an S-box using Gaussian distribution and linear fractional transform is proposed. The S-box is constructed by employing a linear fractional transform based on the Box-Muller transform, polarization decision, and central limit algorithm. In [10] a systematic design methodology to generate a chaotic S-box using difference distribution table (DDT) is proposed. In [11] a heuristic method called the bee waggle dance for designing the S-box is presented. In [12] an innovative scheme of S-box based on the action of projective linear groups on the projective line, and the permutation triangle groups is developed. In [15] an S-box based on artificial bee colony optimization and the chaotic map is proposed. An innovative design of S-boxes using cubic polynomial mapping is proposed in [16]. The use of cubic polynomial maintains the simplicity of the S-box construction method. In [17] the authors focus on S-Boxes corresponding to 3 rounds of a balanced Feistel and a balanced MISTY structure. These constructions use the keys (k_1, k_2, k_3) in their S-boxes, while an S-box is unkeyed. Therefore, the differential and linear properties of the Feistel and MISTY structures need to be analyzed in the unkeyed setting. Also, the main drawback of these structures is the high critical path delay. Non-involutive and involutive 4-bit S-boxes with optimal bit-slice representation are present in [18] and [19]. In [20] a 4-bit S-box is proposed with 11 logic gates and critical path delay equal to $7T_X+4T_A$, where T_A and T_X denote the time delay of a 2-input AND gate and 2-input XOR gate, respectively. In [22] a platform named PEIGEN is presented to evaluate security, find efficient software/hardware implementations, and generate cryptographic S-boxes. The platform is only efficient for 3- and 4-bit S-boxes. The S-box design in work [22] is based on the searching method. Therefore, for small S-boxes (e.g., not more than 4 bits) this searching approach becomes more challenging with large S-boxes (e.g., more than 6-bit), with the difficulty of too large a search space. For instance, there exit $256! \approx 2^{1684}$ possible permutations in $\mathbb{F}_{2^8} \longrightarrow \mathbb{F}_{2^8}$. The implementation searching tool PEIGEN can find the efficient (not always the best) implementation of a given S-box within a set of the invertible instructions. The searching method is based on a bi-directional Dijkstra algorithm and expands the two subgraphs until the predetermined expansion limit is reached (or when a proper stopping rule is satisfied). The expansion limit determines whether the obtained implementation is the best or not. In [23] a technique that involves coset diagrams for the action of a quotient of the modular group on the projective line over the finite field is proposed for constructing the S-box. It is constructed by selecting vertices of the coset diagram in a special manner. A useful transformation involving the Fibonacci sequence is also used in selecting the vertices of the coset diagram. In [24] a method for obtaining random bijective S-boxes based on improved one-dimensional discrete chaotic map is presented. The proposed method uses a special case of the discrete chaotic map based on the composition of permutations, in order to overcome the problem with the potentially short length of the orbits. The special case is based on the composition of permutations and sine function and has a larger minimum length of the orbits. Most of the previous methods [5]-[29] are suitable for software implementation and not efficient for hardware structure. These S-boxes have a high hardware implementation cost.

Peigen is aimed to be a platform covering a comprehensive check-list of design criteria of S-boxes appearing in the literature. Peigen not only integrates most of the features in existing tools, but also equips with functionalities to evaluate new security-related properties, improves the efficiency of the search algorithms for optimized implementations in several aspects.

3 Preliminaries and Cryptanalytic Properties for S-Boxes

An S-box takes m-bit number as input and transforms them into n-bit number as output, where m and n are not necessarily equal [31]. A $m \times n$ S-box can be implemented as a lookup table (LUT) with 2^m words of n bits. In other words, an S-box is a nonlinear mapping from the finite field $\mathbb{F}_{2^n}$ to the finite field $\mathbb{F}_2$. An $n \times m$ S-box can be seen as a vectorial Boolean function $F : \mathbb{F}_{2^n} \longrightarrow \mathbb{F}_{2^m}$. The construction of substitution box (S-box) has always been an important research direction in cryptography. In recent years, many methods of S-box construction have been proposed. In these methods, the S-boxes are constructed based on the nonlinear functions. The two main steps of S-box design are shown in Figure 1. The first step is the construction methodology. In this step, the designers select or propose the methodology for S-box design. The main methodologies in the literature [32] are presented in this figure. In the next step, we have a security analysis of the S-box (more details are presented in the next subsections). The three main cryptographic properties of an S-box are nonlinearity (NL), differential uniformity (DU), and algebraic degree (AD). A cryptographically strong S-box should exhibit high NL, low DU, and high AD. To examine the strength of S-boxes, nonlinearity analysis, strict avalanche criterion, linear approximation probability analysis, and differential uniformity analysis are used. In the following, we presented briefly security parameters that are used for the security evaluation of S-boxes.

3.1 Nonlinearity

For a cryptographic n-bit Boolean function f, the nonlinearity is defined based on the least Hamming distance between the vector representing function's truth table and the set of all n-bit affine functions. The high minimum Hamming distance is proper to high nonlinearity. High nonlinearity provides resistance to linear approximation attacks [33]. The upper bound of nonlinearity is equal to $NL(f) = 2^{n-1} - 2^{n/2-1}$ [34], for an S-box in the finite field $\mathbb{F}_{2^n}$. As an 8-bit S-box in $\mathbb{F}_{2^8}$, the upper bound of NL is 120. As the S-box is generally the only non-linear component in a block cipher, it has to be carefully chosen to ensure a design is secure against linear attacks. The nonlinearity of a Boolean functions f is computed as:

$$NL(f) = 2^{n-1}(1 - 2^{-n} max|S_{<f>}(w)|).$$

$$S_{<f>}(w) = \textstyle\sum_{w \in GF(2^n)} (-1)^{f(x) \oplus x.w}.$$

where, $S_{<f>}(w)$ is the Walsh spectrum of function f and $x.w$ denotes the dot-product of x and w. Also linearity of a Boolean function f is defined as

$$L(f) = max_{a,b \neq 0}|S_{<f>}(w)|.$$

The smaller $L(f)$, the S-box is the stronger against linear attacks. It is well-known that for any function f over finite field $\mathbb{F}_{2^n}$ to $\mathbb{F}_{2^n}$ it keeps that $L(f) \geq 2^{(n+1)/2}$ [35]. Functions that have this bound are called Almost Bent (AB) functions.

However, in the case $n > 4$ and n even, we do not know the minimum value of the linearity that can be achieved [36]. For example, the best linearity value is achieved by the AES S-box with $L(f)$=32, for case n=8.



Figure 1. Main steps of S-box design

3.2 Differential Uniformity (DU)

Differential uniformity (DU) of n-bit S-box f is defined as:

$$DU(F) = max_{\Delta I, \Delta Y \in \mathbb{F}_{2^n}, \Delta I \neq 0} |\{x \in \mathbb{F}_{2^n} : f(x + \Delta I) + f(x) = \Delta Y\}|.$$

where, x is the set of all possible input values of S-box, ΔI is input differential and ΔY is output differential. The largest value in the difference distribution table (after omitting the trivial entry case, $\Delta I = \Delta Y = 0$) is the value of DU for an S-box. To resist against differential cryptanalysis and evaluate the differential property of an S-box we use the parameter DU [37]. The value of DU must be kept as small as possible.

3.3 Strict Avalanche Criterion (SAC)

The work [38] introduces an efficient method of Strict avalanche criterion (SAC) to test the performance of an S-box. Perfect nonlinearity implies an earlier design criterion for S-boxes, namely the strict avalanche criterion (SAC). SAC is essentially a diffusion criterion [22]. If S-box satisfies this criterion, a change (compliment of a bit) in one of the input bits must lead to a change in half of the output bits. In other words, when SAC is satisfied, a small change in the input bits leads to a significant change in the output bits. The acceptable quantified SAC is equal to 0.5. If an S-box has the SAC value close to 0.5, it ensures that it has a good bound of nonlinearity.

3.4 Algebraic Degree (AD)

A n-bit Boolean function f can be represented as a multivariate polynomial over the field $\mathbb{F}_2$, known as its Algebraic Normal Form (ANF), as follows:

$$f(x_1, ..., x_n) = a_0 + a_1.x_1 + ... + a_{1,2}.x_1.x_2 + ... + a_{1,2,...,n}x_1.x_2...x_n = \sum_{I \subseteq \{1,...,n\}} a_I \prod_{i \in I} x_i.$$

where the coefficients $a_0, a_1, ..., a_n, a_{1,2}, ..., a_{1,...,n} \in F_2$. The number of variables in the largest monomial of the ANF is known as the algebraic degree (AD), deg(f). For an n-bit S-box f, there are n component functions f_i, $1 \leq i \leq n$. The algebraic degree is determined by the maximum degree between all component functions:

$$AD(f) = max\{deg(f_1),\ deg(f_2),\ ...,\ deg(f_n)\}.$$

The algebraic degree is considered as a good factor of security against structural attacks, such as integral and higher-order differential. To resist against higher-order differential cryptanalysis [39] the preferable value of algebraic degree must be in the bound of AD(f) ≥ 4 [40].

3.5 Differential Approximation Probability (DAP)

The differential approximation probability (DAP) can reflect the XOR distribution of the input and output of the Boolean function [41]. Let us denote the input and output differentials by ΔI and ΔY, respectively. The differential approximation probability is calculated as follows [41]:

$$DAP(f) = max_{\Delta I \neq 0, \Delta Y} \frac{\#\{x \in X | f(x)+f(x+M_x)=\Delta Y\}}{2^n}$$

where, X denotes the set of all possible inputs and the M_x denotes the input of randomly selected mask. Differential approximation probability returns the difference probability of the difference with the highest probability in the range between 0 and 1. The smaller the DAP, the stronger is the ability of the S-box, resisting against differential cryptanalysis attacks.

3.6 Linear Approximation Probability (LAP)

The imbalance of an event is examined in this analysis. Let us denote the input and output of randomly selected masks by M_x and M_y, respectively. In the following, we used the definition as given in [33] for maximum linear approximation probability (LAP) calculation:

$$LAP(f) = max_{M_x, M_y \neq 0} |\frac{\{x \in X | x.M_x = f(x).M_y\}}{2^n} - \frac{1}{2}|$$

where, X denotes the set of all possible inputs. The smaller the LAP, the stronger of the S-box resistance against linear cryptanalysis attacks, and vice versa.

4 Proposed Structures of the S-Box

One of the important components in many block ciphers is the substitution box or S-box. Therefore, the main part of the implementation cost (area and critical path delay) depends on the S-box layer. Designing an S-box which minimizes the area and timing characteristic is crucial for obtaining optimal results. In this section, we present four S-boxes consist of two 4-bit S-boxes and two 8-bit S-boxes. The proposed structures are simple and low-cost. In the case of 4-bit S-box, we have very compact structures. In this paper, we focus on the construction of 8-bit S-boxes using two smaller 4-bit S-boxes and linear operations. In this case, the implementation of S-boxes requires fewer hardware resources.

4.1 Proposed Hardware Structures of 4-bit S-Boxes

In this paper, we present two 4-bit S-boxes called S_1 and S_2 with similar structure. If (i_0, i_1, i_2, and i_3) and (f_0, f_1, f_2, and f_3) represent the four input and output bits of the S-box (i_0 and f_0 being the least significant bits), respectively. The proposed computations of the S_1 S-box are equal to

$f_3 = i_0 \oplus (i_2.i_3)'$, $f_2 = i_1 \odot (f_3 + i_2)'$, $f_1 = i_2 \oplus (f_2 + i_3)'$, and $f_0 = i_3 \oplus (f_2.f_3)'$.

For the inverse of this S-box S_1^{-1} we have:

$i_3 = f_0 \oplus (f_2.f_3)'$, $i_2 = f_1 \oplus (f_2 + i_3)'$, $i_1 = f_2 \odot (f_3 + i_2)'$, and $i_0 = f_3 \oplus (i_2.i_3)'$.

Also, for S_2 S-box we have

$f_3 = i_0 \odot (i_2 + i_3)'$, $f_2 = i_1 \odot (f_3.i_2)'$, $f_1 = i_2 \oplus (f_2.i_3)'$, and $f_0 = i_3 \oplus (f_2 + f_3)'$.

The inverse of this S-box S_2^{-1} is computed as follows:

$i_3 = f_0 \oplus (f_2 + f_3)'$, $i_2 = f_1 \oplus (i_3.f_2)'$, $i_1 = f_2 \odot (f_2.f_3)'$, and $i_0 = f_3 \odot (i_2 + i_3)'$.

The operators $\oplus$, $\odot$, $+$, and . are equal to XOR, XNOR, OR and AND logic gates, respectively. The values of these S-boxes in hexadecimal notation are given by Table 1.

4.1.1 Difference Distribution Table of the Proposed 4-bit S-Boxes

Consider a system with input $I = [I_1, I_2, ...I_n]$ and output $Y = [Y_1, Y_2, ...Y_n]$. Let two inputs to the system be X' and X'' with the corresponding outputs Y' and Y'', respectively. The input difference and output difference are given by $\Delta I = I' \oplus I''$ and $\Delta Y = Y' \oplus Y''$, respectively, where $\oplus$ represents a bit-wise exclusive-OR of the n-bit vectors and, so,

$$\Delta I = [\Delta I_1, \Delta I_2, ..., \Delta I_n], \Delta Y = [\Delta Y_1, \Delta Y_2, ..., \Delta Y_n]$$

where $\Delta I_i = I'_i \oplus I''_i$, and I'_i and I''_i representing the i^{th} bit of I' and I'', respectively. The probability that a particular output difference ΔY occurs given a particular input difference ΔI is $1/2^n$ where n is the number of bits of I. Differential cryptanalysis explores a scenario where a particular ΔY occurs given a particular input difference ΔI with a very high probability.

The difference distribution table for the S_1 S-box

Table 1. The values of four 4-bit S-boxes S_1 and S_2

i	0	1	2	3	4	5	6	7	8	9	a	b	c	d	e	f
$S_1(i)$	c	3	b	5	e	7	9	1	d	0	8	4	6	f	2	a
$S_2(i)$	3	a	6	e	c	1	8	4	b	2	d	5	f	0	9	7

is given in Table 2. The first column and first row in the table show input difference (ΔI) and output difference (ΔY) values. Each element of the table represents the number of occurrences of the corresponding output difference ΔY value given the input difference ΔI. The largest value in the table is 4, for example corresponding to $\Delta I = 5$ and $\Delta Y = 2$, we have one 4 value. Therefore, the probability that $\Delta Y = 2$ given an arbitrary pair of input values that satisfy $\Delta I = 5$ is $4/16$. The smallest value in the table is 0 and occurs for many difference pairs. In this case, the probability of the ΔY value occurring given the ΔI value is 0.

The largest value in the difference distribution table (after omitting the trivial entry case, $\Delta I = \Delta Y = 0$) is the value of DU for an S-box. The value of DU must be kept as small as possible to resist against differential cryptanalysis. Based on the difference distribution table values the proposed 4-bit S-boxes have a low probability for a particular ΔY occurs given a particular input difference ΔI.

Figure 2 (a) and (b) show the proposed structures of 4-bit S_1 and S_2 S-boxes, respectively. As seen from the figures, the S_1 and S_2 S-boxes can be implemented with (three XOR, one XNOR, two NAND, and two AND operations) and (two XOR, two XNOR, two NAND, and two AND operations), respectively. The constructions are simple and low-cost for hardware implementation. Table 3 shows the hardware results of the proposed structures of 4-bit S-boxes and other related works. As seen from the table, the proposed 4-bit S-boxes have reasonable hardware resources and timing characteristics compared to other 4-bit S-boxes. The area and critical path delay of S_1 and S_2 S-boxes when directly synthesizing the equations using Synopsys Design Compiler tool based on the library of standard cells with 180 nm CMOS technology are equal to (14 GEs and 0.543 ns) and (14 GEs and 0.539 ns), respectively. In [22] for 4-bit S-boxes, the S-box generator with different sets of criteria (CriteriaSet0 to CriteriaSet5) is runed. The area consumed on 180 nm technology for 4-bit S-boxes CriteriaSet0, CriteriaSet1, CriteriaSet2, CriteriaSet3, CriteriaSet4, and CriteriaSet5 are equal to 12∼14.34 GEs, 18∼20.01 GEs, 15.33∼18.67 GEs, 16.33∼21.34 GEs, 20∼21 GEs, and 18∼19.34 GEs, respectively. The proposed 4-bit S-boxes have the lower area than that of the 4-bit S-boxes of CriteriaSet1 to CriteriaSet5 in [22]. The PEIGEN tool in [22] is only efficient for 3- and 4-bit S-boxes. It is said to be in its embryonic stage, because, for larger S-boxes ($\geq$ 5-bit), it is satisfactory only for evaluating security, but not yet powerful enough for implementing and generating strong S-boxes.



Figure 2. The proposed structure of 4-bit S-boxes S_1 (a) and S_2 (b)

Nonlinearity, Linearity, Differential uniformity, Algebraic degree, Differential approximation probability, Linear approximation probability, Strict avalanche criterion of the two S-boxes are equal to 4, 8, 4, 3, 0.25, 0.25, and 0.51, respectively. These security analysis results are equal to the results of the famous 4-bit S-boxes used in the block ciphers such as PRESENT, PICCOLO, and CLEFIA. From the hardware point of view, the proposed structures and two works [43] and [44] are almost similar. But the main difference is for the important parameter SAC. The SAC for the proposed structures S_1, S_2, [43], and [44], are equal to 0.4063, 0.4141, 0.3906, and 0.3906, respectively. As mentioned before, the acceptable quantified SAC is equal to 0.5. If an S-box has a SAC value close to 0.5, it ensures that it has a good bound of nonlinearity.

4.2 Proposed Hardware Structure of the 8-bit S-Boxes

In this subsection, we present the proposed 8-bit S-boxes called SB_1 and SB_2. These S-boxes are constructed based on the proposed 4-bit S-boxes (S_1, S_2), multiplication by 2 in the finite field $\mathbb{F}_{2^4}$, bit-wise XOR, and permutation operations.

4.2.1 SB$_1$

The proposed structure of 8-bit S-box SB_1 is shown in Figure 3. The proposed S-box SB_1 is constructed based on 2-round substitution-permutation network (SPN) structure with bit permutation, two addition, two multiplication by 2, and the small 4-bit S-boxes

Table 2. The difference distribution table for the S_1 S-box

	0	1	2	3	4	5	6	7	8	9	a	b	c	d	e	f
0	16	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
1	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	4	4	0	0	2	2	2	2
2	0	0	0	0	4	4	4	4	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
3	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	4	4	0	0	2	2	2	2
4	0	0	4	0	4	0	0	0	0	0	2	2	0	0	2	2
5	0	0	4	0	0	0	4	0	0	0	2	2	2	2	0	0
6	0	0	4	0	0	4	0	0	0	0	2	2	0	0	2	2
7	0	0	4	0	0	0	0	4	0	0	2	2	2	2	0	0
8	0	4	0	4	0	0	0	0	4	0	0	4	0	0	0	0
9	0	4	0	4	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	2	2	2	2
a	0	0	0	0	2	2	2	2	0	0	0	0	2	2	2	2
b	0	0	0	0	2	2	2	2	4	0	0	4	0	0	0	0
c	0	2	0	2	0	2	0	2	0	2	2	0	2	0	0	2
d	0	2	0	2	0	2	0	2	0	2	2	0	0	2	2	0
e	0	2	0	2	2	0	2	0	0	2	2	0	0	2	2	0
f	0	2	0	2	2	0	2	0	0	2	2	0	2	0	0	2

Table 3. Hardware results of the proposed structures of 4-bit S-boxes and other related works

Works	**# AND (or OR)**	**# NAND (or NOR)**	**# XOR (or XNOR)**	**CPD**
[42], SS_0	26	—	3	$T_A+T_X+2T_O$
[42], SS_1	31	—	1	$3T_A+2T_O$
[42], SS_2	34	—	1	$2T_A+3T_O$
[42], SS_3	36	—	1	$3T_A+2T_O$
[43]	—	4	4	$2T_X+2T_{NO}$
[44]	—	4	4	$2T_X+2T_{NO}$
[45]	20	—	7	$T_X+T_A+2T_O$
[18]	4	—	4	$2T_X+T_A+T_O$
[19]	4	—	4	$4T_X+4T_A$
[20]	4	—	7	$7T_X+4T_A$
TW S_1	—	4	4	$T_{NA}+2T_X+T_{XN}+2T_{NO}$
TW S_2	—	4	4	$T_{NA}+T_X+2T_{XN}+2T_{NO}$

TW: This work; T_A, T_{NA}, T_X, T_{XN}, T_O, T_{NO}, T_M denote the time delay of a 2-input AND gate, 2-input NAND gate, 2-input XOR gate, 2-input XNOR gate, 2-input OR gate, and 2-input NOR gate, respectively.

S_1 and S_2. This S-box is similar to S_0 S-box in the CLAFIA block cipher [46]. Let $i[7:0]$ represents the 8-bit input of the S-box (i_7 being the most significant bit), this block is constructed based on the four 4-bit S-boxes S_1 and S_2 as the following computations:

$$g_0[3:0] \leftarrow S_1(i[7:4]), \quad g_1[3:0] \leftarrow S_2(i[3:0]),$$
$$h_0[3:0] \leftarrow g_0[3:0] \oplus 0\text{x}2 \times g_1[3:0], \quad h_1[3:0] \leftarrow g_1[3:0] \oplus 0\text{x}2 \times g_0[3:0],$$
$$f[7:4] \leftarrow S_2(h_0[3:0]), \quad f[3:0] \leftarrow S_1(h_1[3:0]) \;.$$

The inverse of this S-box SB_1^{-1} is computed as follows:

$$h_0[3:0] \leftarrow S_2^{-1}(f[7:4]), \quad h_1[3:0] \leftarrow S_1^{-1}(f[3:0]),$$
$$g_0[3:0] \leftarrow h_0[3:0] \oplus 0\text{x}2 \times g_1[3:0], \quad g_1[3:0] \leftarrow h_1[3:0] \oplus 0\text{x}2 \times g_0[3:0],$$
$$i[7:4] \leftarrow S_1^{-1}(g_0[3:0]), \quad i[3:0] \leftarrow S_2^{-1}(g_1[3:0]).$$

The multiplication by 0x2 in terms $0\text{x}2g_0$ and $0\text{x}2g_1$ is performed in field $\mathbb{F}_{2^4}$ constructed by the primitive polynomial $f_2(z) = z^4 + z + 1$. The structure of multiplication by 0x2 in the field $\mathbb{F}_{2^4}$ is shown in Figure 3. The S-box is constructed by using four low-cost S_1 and S_2 S-boxes, two field additions and two multiplications by constant 0x2 over the field $\mathbb{F}_{2^4}$. The computations of S-box SB_1 are as follows:

$$\xrightarrow{S_1} \begin{cases} T_{1,3} = i_4 \oplus (i_6.i_7)' \\ T_{1,2} = i_5 \odot (T_{1,3} + i_6)' \\ T_{1,1} = i_6 \oplus (T_{1,2} + i_7)' \\ T_{1,0} = i_7 \oplus (T_{1,2}.T_{1,3})' \end{cases}$$

$$\xrightarrow{S_2} \begin{cases} T_{2,3} = i_0 \odot (i_2 + i_3)' \\ T_{2,2} = i_1 \odot (T_{2,3}.i_2)' \\ T_{2,1} = i_2 \oplus (T_{2,2}.i_3)' \\ T_{2,0} = i_3 \oplus (T_{2,2} + T_{2,3})' \end{cases}$$



Figure 3. The structure of 8-bit S-box SB_1

$$\xrightarrow{\times 2}\begin{cases} T_{3,3} = T_{1,2} \\ T_{3,2} = T_{1,1} \\ T_{3,1} = T_{1,0} \oplus T_{1,3} \\ T_{3,0} = T_{1,3} \end{cases} \quad \xrightarrow{\times 2}\begin{cases} T_{4,3} = T_{2,2} \\ T_{4,2} = T_{2,1} \\ T_{4,1} = T_{2,0} \oplus T_{2,3} \\ T_{4,0} = T_{2,3} \end{cases}$$

$$\xrightarrow{Add}\begin{cases} T_{5,3} = T_{2,3} \oplus T_{3,3} \\ T_{5,2} = T_{2,2} \oplus T_{3,2} \\ T_{5,1} = T_{2,1} \oplus T_{3,1} \\ T_{5,0} = T_{2,0} \oplus T_{3,0} \end{cases} \quad \xrightarrow{Add}\begin{cases} T_{6,3} = T_{1,3} \oplus T_{4,3} \\ T_{6,2} = T_{1,2} \oplus T_{4,2} \\ T_{6,1} = T_{1,1} \oplus T_{4,1} \\ T_{6,0} = T_{1,0} \oplus T_{4,0} \end{cases}$$

$$\xrightarrow{S_2}\begin{cases} f_7 = T_{6,0} \odot (T_{6,2} + T_{6,3})' \\ f_6 = T_{6,1} \odot (f_7.T_{6,2})' \\ f_5 = T_{6,2} \oplus (f_6.T_{6,3})' \\ f_4 = T_{6,3} \oplus (f_6 + f_7)' \end{cases}$$

$$\xrightarrow{S_1}\begin{cases} f_3 = T_{5,0} \oplus (T_{5,2}.T_{5,3})' \\ f_2 = T_{5,1} \odot (f_3 + T_{5,2})' \\ f_1 = T_{5,2} \oplus (f_2 + T_{5,3})' \\ f_0 = T_{5,3} \oplus (f_2.f_3)' \end{cases}$$

In these equations i_0 to i_7, f_0 to f_7 and $T_{m,n}$, where $1 \leq m \leq 6, 0 \leq n \leq 3$, are used for denote of the input, output and intermediate variables, respectively. The critical path delay of S-box in the proposed structure is equal to $T_{S1} + T_{S2} + 2T_X$, where T_{S1}, T_{S2}, and T_X are time delay of the 4-bit S_1 S-box, 4-bit S_2 S-box, and the 2-input XOR gate, respectively. The values of proposed 8-bit S-box SB_1 are presented in Table 4.

4.2.2 SB$_2$

The proposed S-box SB_2 is similar to the MISTY construction, which is a construction to build an 8-bit S-box from smaller 4-bit functions (such as 4-bit S-boxes, 4-bit permutations, etc.). We here focus on constructions with a 3-round network. It is a good candidate for constructing large S-boxes from smaller ones at a reasonable implementation cost. Therefore, constructing 8-bit S-box from smaller ones can reduce the implementation cost. The proposed 8-bit S-box SB_2 is composed of five permutation blocks, two 4-bit S-boxes S_1 and one 4-bit S-box S_2, multiplication by constant 0x2, and addition operations in sequence. The proposed structure of 8-bit S-box SB_2 is shown in Figure 4. In this S-box, we have five permutation blocks called P_1, P_2, P_3, P_4, and P_5 which are as presented as follows:

$P_{o1}[0] = P_{i1}[3]$, $P_{o1}[1] = P_{i1}[0]$, $P_{o1}[2] = P_{i1}[2]$, $P_{o1}[3] = P_{i1}[1]$

$P_{o2}[0] = P_{i2}[0]$, $P_{o2}[1] = P_{i2}[2]$, $P_{o2}[2] = P_{i2}[3]$, $P_{o2}[3] = P_{i2}[1]$

$P_{o3}[0] = P_{i3}[1]$, $P_{o3}[1] = P_{i3}[0]$, $P_{o3}[2] = P_{i3}[3]$, $P_{o3}[3] = P_{i3}[2]$

$P_{o4}[0] = P_{i4}[2]$, $P_{o4}[1] = P_{i4}[1]$, $P_{o4}[2] = P_{i4}[3]$, $P_{o4}[3] = P_{i4}[0]$

$P_{o5}[0] = P_{i5}[3]$, $P_{o5}[1] = P_{i5}[2]$, $P_{o5}[2] = P_{i5}[0]$, $P_{o5}[3] = P_{i5}[1]$

where, the P_{oj}, P_{ij}, $1 \leq j \leq 5$, are the inputs and outputs of five permutations, respectively. The computations of S-box SB_2 are as follows:

$$\xrightarrow{NOT}\begin{cases} T_{1,3} = Si_4' \\ T_{1,2} = Si_5 \\ T_{1,1} = Si_6' \\ T_{1,0} = Si_7 \end{cases} \quad \xrightarrow{P_1}\begin{cases} T_{2,3} = T_{1,1} \\ T_{2,2} = T_{1,2} \\ T_{2,1} = T_{1,0} \\ T_{2,0} = T_{1,3} \end{cases}$$

$$\xrightarrow{S_1}\begin{cases} T_{3,3} = T_{2,0} \oplus (T_{2,2}.T_{2,3})' \\ T_{3,2} = T_{2,1} \odot (T_{3,3} + T_{2,2})' \\ T_{3,1} = T_{2,2} \oplus (T_{3,2} + T_{2,3})' \\ T_{3,0} = T_{2,3} \oplus (T_{3,2}.T_{3,3})' \end{cases}$$

$$\xrightarrow{Add}\begin{cases} T_{4,3} = T_{3,3} \oplus Si_0 \\ T_{4,2} = T_{3,2} \oplus Si_2 \\ T_{4,1} = T_{3,1} \oplus Si_3 \\ T_{4,0} = T_{3,0} \oplus Si_1 \end{cases}$$

$$\xrightarrow{P_2}\begin{cases} T_{5,3} = T_{4,1} \\ T_{5,2} = T_{4,3} \\ T_{5,1} = T_{4,2} \\ T_{5,0} = T_{4,0} \end{cases} \quad \xrightarrow{\times 2}\begin{cases} T_{6,3} = T_{4,2} \\ T_{6,2} = T_{4,1} \\ T_{6,1} = T_{4,0} \oplus T_{4,3} \\ T_{6,0} = T_{4,3} \end{cases}$$

Table 4. The values of proposed 8-bit S-box SB_1

	0	1	2	3	4	5	6	7	8	9	a	b	c	d	e	f
0	dd	53	3f	e7	41	98	75	ca	2c	b0	19	82	ae	f4	0b	66
1	17	c6	7c	fd	b8	a1	32	5b	8f	4e	d4	25	90	e9	6a	03
2	09	fa	45	c4	30	2e	bf	e3	92	71	6d	ac	88	57	d6	1b
3	e0	6c	26	de	99	44	8b	02	33	ad	f1	7a	b7	18	c5	5f
4	b6	27	60	a3	15	f2	01	84	5e	df	4b	c8	ec	9a	79	3d
5	af	3e	5d	bc	fb	1a	c9	78	67	e6	95	04	d3	42	81	20
6	7b	94	11	8a	6f	5c	d0	a7	f8	05	36	ee	c2	23	bd	49
7	43	8d	0e	96	d2	e5	68	29	c0	1c	ba	51	ff	ab	34	77
8	58	d5	aa	61	87	7d	93	1f	bb	24	ce	46	39	00	fc	e2
9	85	48	f9	72	56	63	ed	be	14	cb	2f	d7	0a	3c	a0	91
a	9c	70	c7	4f	ea	db	54	31	0d	f3	a2	69	16	b5	28	8e
b	64	eb	b2	59	7e	80	4c	f6	a5	38	07	9f	21	cd	13	da
c	3a	a9	d8	2b	0c	cf	1e	9d	e1	62	73	f0	55	86	47	b4
d	22	b1	e4	35	c3	06	f7	40	d9	5a	8c	1d	6b	7f	9e	a8
e	c1	12	9b	08	2d	37	a6	dc	4a	89	50	b3	74	6e	ef	f5
f	fe	0f	83	10	a4	b9	2a	65	76	97	e8	3b	4d	d1	52	cc

$$\xrightarrow{NOT}\begin{cases} T_{7,3} = T_{5,3} \\ T_{7,2} = T_{5,2} \\ T_{7,1} = T'_{5,1} \\ T_{7,0} = T'_{5,0} \end{cases}$$

$$\xrightarrow{P_3}\begin{cases} T_{8,3} = T_{7,2} \\ T_{8,2} = T_{7,3} \\ T_{8,1} = T_{7,0} \\ T_{8,0} = T_{7,1} \end{cases} \quad \xrightarrow{S_2}\begin{cases} T_{9,3} = T_{8,0} \odot (T_{8,2} + T_{8,3})' \\ T_{9,2} = T_{8,1} \odot (T_{9,3}.T_{8,2})' \\ T_{9,1} = T_{8,2} \oplus (T_{9,2}.T_{8,3})' \\ T_{9,0} = T_{8,3} \oplus (T_{9,2} + T_{9,3})' \end{cases}$$

$$\xrightarrow{Add}\begin{cases} So_3 = T_{9,3} \oplus Si_7 \\ So_2 = T_{9,2} \oplus Si_6 \\ So_1 = T_{9,1} \oplus Si_5 \\ So_0 = T_{9,0} \oplus Si_4 \end{cases} \quad \xrightarrow{NOT}\begin{cases} T_{10,3} = So_3 \\ T_{10,2} = So_2 \\ T_{10,1} = So'_1 \\ T_{10,0} = So'_0 \end{cases}$$

$$\xrightarrow{P_4}\begin{cases} T_{11,3} = T_{6,0} \\ T_{11,2} = T_{6,3} \\ T_{11,1} = T_{6,1} \\ T_{11,0} = T_{6,2} \end{cases}$$

$$\xrightarrow{P_5}\begin{cases} T_{12,3} = T_{10,1} \\ T_{12,2} = T_{10,0} \\ T_{12,1} = T_{10,2} \\ T_{12,0} = T_{10,3} \end{cases}$$

$$\xrightarrow{S_1}\begin{cases} T_{13,3} = T_{12,0} \oplus (T_{12,2}.T_{12,3})' \\ T_{13,2} = T_{12,1} \odot (T_{13,3} + T_{12,2})' \\ T_{13,1} = T_{12,2} \oplus (T_{13,2} + T_{12,3})' \\ T_{13,0} = T_{12,3} \oplus (T_{13,2}.T_{13,3})' \end{cases}$$

$$\xrightarrow{Add}\begin{cases} So_7 = T_{11,0} \oplus T_{13,3} \\ So_4 = T_{11,2} \oplus T_{13,2} \\ So_5 = T_{11,1} \oplus T_{13,1} \\ So_6 = T_{11,3} \oplus T_{13,0}. \end{cases}$$

The input, output and intermediate variables are denoted by Si_0 to Si_7, So_0 to So_7 and $T_{d1,d2}$, where $1 \leq d1 \leq 13, 0 \leq d2 \leq 3$, respectively. As seen in Figure 4, the proposed S-box is constructed using only logic gates with an low-cost structure. The critical path delay of S-box in the proposed structure is reduced to $T_{S1}+T_{S2}+5T_X+T_{XN}+2T_{NO}+3T_N$, where T_{S1}, T_{S2}, T_X, T_{XN}, T_{NO} and T_N are time delay of the 4-bit S-box S_1, 4-bit S-box S_2, 2-input XOR gate, 2-input XNOR gate, 2-input NOR gate, and Not gate, respectively. The action of the proposed 8-bit S-box SB_2 in hexadecimal notation is given by Table 5.

5 Results and Comparison

In this section, we compare the proposed structures of S-boxes with other works. The comparison is performed based on ASIC hardware implementation and security analysis. The ASIC results in the proposed structures are achieved by using the Synopsys Design Compiler tool based on the library of standard cells with 180 nm CMOS technology. The area is measured in gate equivalents (GE). The performance and results of the designs are evaluated in terms of critical path delay (CPD) or delay, area, and area×delay. Criteria and security analysis results for 8-bit S-boxes are shown in Table 6.



Figure 4. The structure of 8-bit S-box SB_2

Table 5. The values of proposed 8-bit S-box SB_2

	0	1	2	3	4	5	6	7	8	9	a	b	c	d	e	f
0	3f	30	fb	a2	bc	11	a3	da	89	57	5d	b5	88	b4	76	fe
1	0c	84	98	26	07	ef	99	85	aa	d3	2e	01	d2	8b	ed	20
2	3e	e3	51	48	ed	82	29	10	1a	36	f4	7c	5b	95	9f	77
3	60	59	2f	92	38	21	ac	f3	c5	2d	4b	47	8e	06	0a	a4
4	7e	87	05	08	86	1f	24	db	5a	52	a0	3c	a1	a9	73	7d
5	34	19	6f	f6	15	8a	f7	0e	91	6d	0b	23	02	2c	90	b8
6	a6	09	04	dd	c7	9a	fc	45	81	bf	53	7b	12	be	c8	e0
7	22	2a	b0	ae	d9	d1	63	af	35	8c	d7	18	ad	74	b6	cb
8	16	9e	5c	c0	3d	d5	df	e1	b2	eb	79	54	ca	b3	78	b7
9	8f	67	f1	0d	e4	6c	d0	ce	ba	c3	65	68	c2	9b	c6	69
a	1d	13	ff	17	de	72	94	1c	ea	75	58	41	ab	d6	00	39
b	70	49	44	bb	28	31	a7	fa	66	ee	62	4c	4d	a5	03	cf
c	d4	e8	3a	32	f5	3b	c1	c9	40	8d	0f	96	93	cc	97	6e
d	f9	e5	43	6b	6a	c4	d8	f0	dc	71	e7	1e	9d	e2	7f	e6
e	37	e9	33	1b	56	7a	a8	80	61	4e	55	ec	f2	4f	cd	14
f	bd	64	5f	50	25	9c	5e	83	4a	42	f8	46	b1	b9	2b	27

The used S-boxes in the AES and CLEFIA (S_1) are the best S-boxes with cryptographic properties of (112, 4, 32, 7) for its NL, DU, L, and AD, respectively. These S-boxes are contracted based on finite field inversion over a field $\mathbb{F}_{2^8}$. The quantified SAC for proposed S-boxes SB_1 and SB_2 are equal to 0.5234 and 0.5097, respectively, which are acceptable statistics since they are close to 0.5. As seen in Table 6, the security analysis results (cryptographic properties) for the proposed methods are reasonable compared to other works. Differential and linear properties of the proposed 8-bit S-boxes are equal to 96 and 64, respectively, which are comparable to those of the other 8-bit S-boxes. The CPD, hardware resources, and CPD×Area parameters of the proposed S-boxes are the best results between other S-boxes. There are improvements over previous work, but further work is required to determine whether different structures can provide better S-boxes.

Based on Table 6 the performance of the proposed 8-bit S-boxes is summarized as follows:

- Proposed S-boxes have a reasonable value of nonlinearity compared to other S-boxes in Table 6.
- The SAC values 0.5234 and 0.5097 for the proposed S-boxes SB_1 and SB_2, respectively, are very near to ideal value of SAC (0.5).
- Differential approximation probability (DAP) values of the proposed S-box SB_1 and SB_2 are just 0.046875 and 0.0625, respectively. These small values of DAP reveal the cryptographic strength of our S-boxes.
- Proposed S-boxes have a Linear approximation

Table 6. Criteria and security analysis results for 8-bit S-boxes

Works	NL	DU	L	AD	DAP	LAP	SAC
[47] AES	112	4	32	7	0.015625	0.0625	0.5058
[46] CLEFIA S_0	100	10	56	7	0.0390625	0.109375	—-
[46] CLEFIA S_1	112	4	32	7	0.015625	0.0625	—
[43] SKINNY	64	64	128	6	0.25	0.25	—
[21] MIDORI, SSb_0-SSb_3	64	64	128	6	0.25	0.25	—
[48] ICEBERG	96	8	64	7	0.03125	0.125	—
[19] Fantomas	96	16	64	5	—	—	—
[49] Khazad	96	8	64	7	0.03125	0.125	—
[19] Robin	96	16	64	6	—	—	—
[50] Scream V3	96	8	64	6	0.03125	0.125	—
[51] Whirlpool	100	8	56	7	0.03125	0.109375	—
[5]	112	—	—	—	0.015625	0.0625	0.510254
[6]	112	4	—	—	—	0.062	—
[7]	107.5	4	—	—	0.0390	0.1406	0.5093
[9]	108	4	—	—	0.023	0.086	0.039
[25] I	112	—	—	—	0.015625	0.0625	0.503174
[25] II	112	—	—	—	0.015625	0.0625	0.503174
[25] III	112	—	—	—	0.015625	0.0625	0.499512
[25] IV	112	—	—	—	0.015625	0.0625	0.496094
[25] V	112	—	—	—	0.015625	0.0625	0.503174
[25] VI	112	—	—	—	0.015625	0.0625	0.503662
[25] VII	112	—	—	—	0.015625	0.0625	0.502441
[25] VIII	112	—	—	—	0.015625	0.0625	0.495361
[16]	106.8	—	—	—	0.054	0.140	0.507
[26]	100	—	—	—	0.0625	0.179688	0.4812
[27]	96	8	64	6	—	—	—
[23]	110.50	—	—	—	0.0234	0.0860	0.5031
[28]	103	—	—	—	0.0390625	0.136719	0.4961
[29]	100	—	—	—	0.0390625	0.140625	0.5020
TW, SB_1	96	12	64	6	0.046875	0.125	0.5234
TW, SB_2	96	16	64	6	0.0625	0.125	0.5097

TW: This work; NL: Nonlinearity; L.: Linearity; DU:Differential Uniformity; AD:Algebraic Degree; DAP: Differential Approximation Probability; LAP: Linear Approximation Probability; SAC: Strict Avalanche Criterion.

probability (LAP) value equal to 0.125. This small value guarantees that the proposed 8-bit S-boxes have the potential to confront the linear cryptanalysis.

The hardware and timing complexities of the proposed 8-bit S-boxes and other S-boxes are given in Table 7. In this table, the number of consumed logic gates and critical path delay are compared. In [56] and [61] propose the compact and highly efficient field inversion structure over $\mathbb{F}_{2^8}$ based on a combination of the non-redundant and redundant finite field. An optimal normal basis and redundant finite field representations (polynomial ring representation and redundantly represented basis) to implement inversion over $\mathbb{F}_{2^8}$ using a tower field over $\mathbb{F}_{(2^4)^2}$. In [58] two low-cost and fast designs for the AES S-box are presented. The authors also introduced a number of heuristic and exhaustive search methods for minimizing the area of the S-box. The number of logic gates in the proposed work is comparable with those in other works.

The SKINNY [43] and MIDORI-64(-128) [21] S-boxes have lower area consumed than that of the proposed works. But the security level of the proposed S-boxes SB_1 and SB_2 are higher than that of the SKINNY and MIDORI-64(-128) S-boxes. For example, the cryptographic properties of the proposed S-boxes SB_1, SB_2, the 8-bit SKINNY S-box, and the 8-bit MIDORI-64(-128) S-boxes (SSb_0-SSb_3) are equal to (96, 12, 64, 6, 0.046875, 0.125), (96, 12, 64, 6, 0.0625, 0.125), (64, 64, 128, 6, 0.25, 0.25), and (64, 64, 128, 6, 0.25, 0.25), for the terms (NL, DU, L, AD, DAP, LAP), respectively. One of the most important problems of the Skinny 8-bit S-box is the low value of the Nonlinearity parameter and the high value of the Linearity parameter. These two numbers for this S-box are 64 and 128, respectively. However, these two parameters for our S-boxes are 96 and 64, respectively. Therefore, the Nonlinearity parameter for the proposed S-boxes is higher than that of Skinny 8-bit S-box, and in the case of the Linearity parameter, the obtained value for the proposed works is much less.

The hardware implementation results of the proposed and other 8-bit S-boxes are shown in Table 8. As seen from the table, the proposed S-boxes SB_1 and SB_2 have a reasonable implementation cost. These S-boxes can be as the good candidates for block ciphers with low area consumption and reasonable security level.

6 Conclusion

The S-box is one of the important components in many block ciphers. Therefore, the main part of the implementation depends on S-box. Designing an S-box which minimizes the area and timing characteristic is crucial for obtaining optimal results. Cryptographic devices are constrained in terms of execution time and computational resources. In this paper, we present four area-optimized S-boxes including two 4-bit S-boxes (S_1 and S_2) and two 8-bit S-boxes (SB_1 and SB_2), which are suitable for the development of lightweight block ciphers. The proposed structures of 4-bit S-boxes are constructed based on only 8 logic gates. The 8-bit SB_1 and SB_2 S-boxes are constructed based on 4-bit S-boxes S_1 and S_2, multiplication by constant 0x2 in the finite field $\mathbb{F}_{2^4}$,

Table 7. Hardware results of the proposed 8-bit S-boxes and other works

Works	XOR/ XNOR	AND/ OR	NAND/ NOR	MUX	CPD
[62]	91	—	36	—	—
[52]	117	35	—	—	$20T_X + 3T_A$
[53]	123	36	—	—	$23T_X + 4T_A$
[54]	83	32	—	—	$21T_X + T_{NX} + 4T_A$
[55]	154	36	—	—	$21T_X + T_N + 4T_A$
[56], F	93	55	—	—	$11T_X + 3T_A$
[56], C	87	54	—	—	$11T_X + 3T_A + T_O$
[57]	216	141	—	—	$11T_X + 3T_A + T_O$
[58], F	79	—	41	—	$11T_X + 4T_{NA} + T_{NO} + T_N$
[58], C	69	41	—	—	$16T_X + 4T_{NA} + T_N$
[59]	130	35	—	—	$24T_X + 4T_A + T_N$
[60], F	78	4	42	6	$7T_X + T_A + 1T_{XN} + 2T_{NO} + T_M$
[60], TO	69	—	32	10	$8T_X + 2T_{XN} + T_{NA} + 2T_{NO} + T_M$
[60], C	64	4	23	6	$18T_X + 2T_{XN} + T_{NA} + 2T_{NO} + T_M$
[43] SKINNY	8	—	8	—	$4T_X + 4T_{NO}$
[21] MIDORI, SSb_0-SSb_3	4	4	28	—	$T_X + 2T_{NO}$
TW SB_1	26	—	16	—	$5T_X + 3T_{XN} + 2T_{NA} + 4T_{NO}$
TW SB_2	25	—	12	—	$8T_X + 4T_{XN} + 2T_{NA} + 6T_{NO} + 3T_N$

TW: This work; TO: trade-off; C: Compact; F: Fast; T_A, T_{NA}, T_X, T_{XN}, T_O, T_{NO}, T_N, T_M denote the time delay of a 2-input AND gate, 2-input NAND gate, 2-input XOR gate, 2-input XNOR gate, 2-input OR gate, 2-input NOR gate, NOT gate, and 2-to-1 multiplexer, respectively.

field additions, and permutation blocks. The cryptographic strength of the proposed S-boxes is analyzed by studying the standard properties of an S-box. The implementation results of the proposed architectures in 180 nm CMOS technology are achieved. The results show that the proposed structures have reasonable hardware resources, timing characteristics, and security properties compared to the other works.

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Table 8. Implementation results of the proposed 8-bit S-boxes and other works

Works	Technology	Area(GE)	CPD(ns)	Area × Time
[47] AES	180nm	236	5.69	1342.84
[42] CLEFIA S_0	180nm	209	0.964	201.476
[42] CLEFIA S_1	180nm	291	2.59	753.69
[49] Khazad	180nm	154	2.48	381.92
[19] Fantomas	180nm	130	2.43	315.9
[19] Robin	180nm	79	2.37	187.23
[50] Scream V3	180nm	87	2.38	207.06
[51] Whirlpool	180nm	146	2.37	346.02
[48] ICEBERG	180nm	151	2.39	360.89
[61]	65nm	332	3.17	1052.44
[62]	130nm	234	—	—
[63], Canright	250nm	400	5	2000
[63], Satoh	250nm	438	5.93	2597.34
[63], Wolkers-torfer	250nm	412	5.94	2447.28
[63], Hw-lut	250nm	1302	5.88	7655.76
[63], Sub16-lut	250nm	1957	4.46	8728.22
[63], Hybrid-lut	250nm	799	5.83	4658.17
[63], Bertoni	250nm	1399	3.31	4630.69
[63], Bertoni-2stg	250nm	1421	3.26	4632.46
[56], Fast	65nm	262	2.78	728.36
[56], Compact	65nm	249	3.04	756.96
[58], Fast	65nm	208	0.78	162.24
[58], Compact	65nm	188	1.198	225.224
[53]	180nm	272	10	2720
TW SB_1	180nm	83	1.362	113.046
TW SB_2	180nm	82	1.904	156.128

TW: This work.

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