ORIGINAL_ARTICLE
CPA on COLM Authenticated Cipher and the Protection Using Domain-Oriented Masking
Authenticated encryption schemes are important cryptographic primitives that received extensive attention recently. They can provide both confidentiality and authenticity services, simultaneously. Correlation power analysis (CPA) can be a thread for authenticated ciphers, similar to the any physical implementation of any other cryptographic scheme. In this paper, a three-step CPA attack against COLM, one of the winners of CAESAR, is presented to indicate its vulnerability. To validate this attack, COLM is implemented on the FPGA of the SAKURA-G board. A successful CPA attack with zero value power model is mounted by measuring and collecting 1,800 power traces. In addition, a protected hardware architecture for COLM is proposed to make this design secure against first-order CPA attacks, where a domain-oriented masking (DOM) scheme with two-input/output shares is used to protect it. To verify these countermeasures, we mount first and second-order CPA attacks and a non-specified t-test on the protected COLM. Keywords: Authenticated Cipher, COLM, CPA, DOM, Masking.
https://www.isecure-journal.com/article_110233_2365c809ee540bc12606e626eb3d00f6.pdf
2020-07-01
67
80
10.22042/isecure.2020.191916.471
Authenticated Cipher
COLM
CPA
DOM
masking
Mohsen
Jahanbani
mjahanbani@ihu.ac.ir
1
Imam Hossein Comprehensive University
AUTHOR
Nasour
Bagheri
na.bagheri@gmail.com
2
Electrical Engineering Department, Shahid Rajaee Teacher Training University, Tehran 16788-15811, Iran
LEAD_AUTHOR
Zynolabedin
Norozi
znorozi@ihu.ac.ir
3
Information Technology and Communication Faculty, Imam Hossein Comprehensive University, Tehran, Iran
AUTHOR
[1] Doug Whiting, Russ Housley, and Niels Ferguson. Counter with CBC-MAC (CCM). RFC3610, 2003.
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[7] Elena Andreeva, Andrey Bogdanov, Nilanjan Datta, Atul Luykx, Bart Mennink, Mridul Nandi, Elmar Tischhauser, and Kan Yasuda. COLM v1. CAESAR competition proposal, 2016. http://competitions.cr.yp.to/ round3/colmv1.pdf .
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[10] Niels Samwel and Joan Daemen. DPA on hardware implementations of Ascon and Keyak. In Proceedings of the Computing Frontiers Conference, pages 415–424. ACM, 2017.
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[12] Svetla Nikova, Vincent Rijmen, and Martin Schläffer. Secure hardware implementation of nonlinear functions in the presence of glitches. Journal of Cryptology, 24(2):292–321, 2011. [13] William Diehl, Abubakr Abdulgadir, Farnoud Farahmand, Jens-Peter Kaps, and Kris Gaj. Comparison of cost of protection against differential power analysis of selected authenticated ciphers. Cryptography, 2(3):26, 2018.
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[14] Mohsen Jahanbani, Zeinolabedin Norozi, and Nasour Bagheri. DPA protected implementation of OCB and COLM authenticated ciphers. IEEE Access, 7:139815–139826, 2019.
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[15] Eric Brier, Christophe Clavier, and Francis Olivier. Correlation power analysis with a leakage model. In International workshop on cryptographic hardware and embedded systems, pages 16–29. Springer, 2004.
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[16] Hannes Gross, Stefan Mangard, and Thomas Korak. Domain-oriented masking: Compact masked hardware implementations with arbitrary protection order. Cryptology ePrint Archive, Report 2016/486, 2016. https://eprint.iacr. org/2016/486 .
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[17] A Generic Side-Channel Distinguisher, Benedikt Gierlichs, Lejla Batina, Pim Tuyls, and Bart Preneel. Mutual information analysis. In Cryptographic Hardware and Embedded Systems–CHES 2008: 10th International Workshop, Washington, DC, USA, August 10-13, 2008, Proceedings, page 426. Springer Science & Business Media, 2008.
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[18] Dakshi Agrawal, Josyula R Rao, and Pankaj Rohatgi. Multi-channel attacks. In International Workshop on Cryptographic Hardware and Embedded Systems, pages 2–16. Springer, 2003.
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[19] Stefan Mangard, Elisabeth Oswald, and Thomas Popp. Power analysis attacks: Revealing the secrets of smart cards, volume 31. Springer Science & Business Media, 2008.
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[22] Begül Bilgin, Benedikt Gierlichs, Svetla Nikova, Ventzislav Nikov, and Vincent Rijmen. A more efficient AES threshold implementation. In International Conference on Cryptology in Africa, pages 267–284. Springer, 2014.
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[23] Hannes Groß, Stefan Mangard, and Thomas Korak. An efficient side-channel protected AES implementation with arbitrary protection order. In Cryptographers’ Track at the RSA Conference, pages 95–112. Springer, 2017.
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[24] Amir Moradi. Advances in side-channel security. PhD thesis, Habilitation thesis, Ruhr-Universität Bochum, 2016.
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[25] Amir Moradi, Axel Poschmann, San Ling, Christof Paar, and Huaxiong Wang. Pushing the limits: A very compact and a threshold implementation of AES. In Annual International Conference on the Theory and Applications of Cryptographic Techniques, pages 69–88. Springer, 2011.
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[29] Thomas De Cnudde, Oscar Reparaz, Begül Bilgin, Svetla Nikova, Ventzislav Nikov, and Vincent Rijmen. Masking AES with d + 1 shares in hardware. In International Conference on Cryptographic Hardware and Embedded Systems, pages 194–212. Springer, 2016.
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[30] Begül Bilgin, Benedikt Gierlichs, Svetla Nikova, Ventzislav Nikov, and Vincent Rijmen. Tradeoffs for threshold implementations illustrated on AES. IEEE Transactions on ComputerAided Design of Integrated Circuits and Systems, 34(7):1188–1200, 2015.
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[31] Felix Wegener and Amir Moradi. A first-order SCA resistant AES without fresh randomness. In International Workshop on Constructive SideChannel Analysis and Secure Design, pages 245– 262. Springer, 2018.
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[32] Ashrujit Ghoshal and Thomas De Cnudde. Several masked implementations of the boyarperalta AES S-box. In International Conference on Cryptology in India, pages 384–402. Springer, 2017.
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[33] Rei Ueno, Naofumi Homma, and Takafumi Aoki. Toward more efficient DPA-resistant AES hardware architecture based on threshold implementation. In International Workshop on Constructive Side-Channel Analysis and Secure Design, pages 50–64. Springer, 2017.
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33
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36
ORIGINAL_ARTICLE
Enhanced Flush+Reload Attack on AES
In cloud computing, multiple users can share the same physical machine that can potentially leak secret information, in particular when the memory de-duplication is enabled. Flush+Reload attack is a cache-based attack that makes use of resource sharing. T-table implementation of AES is commonly used in the crypto libraries like OpenSSL. Several Flush+Reload attacks on T-table implementation of AES have been proposed in the literature which requires a notable number of encryptions. In this paper, we present a technique to enhance the Flush+Reload attack on AES in the ciphertext-only scenario by significantly reducing the number of needed encryptions in both native and cross-VM setups. In this paper, we focus on finding the wrong key candidates and keep the right key by considering only the cache miss event. Our attack is faster than previous Flush+Reload attacks. In particular, our method can speed-up the Flush+Reload attack in cross-VM environment significantly. To verify the theoretical model, we implemented the proposed attack.
https://www.isecure-journal.com/article_110645_e75416f302361e86e20cb03dbf7fbed6.pdf
2020-07-01
81
89
10.22042/isecure.2020.219248.519
Memory de-duplication
Flush+Reload attack
AES
T-table implementation
Milad
Seddigh
milladseddigh7@gmail.com
1
Cyberspace Research Institute, Shahid Beheshti University, Iran
AUTHOR
Hadi
Soleimany
h_soleimany@sbu.ac.ir
2
Iran-Tehran
LEAD_AUTHOR
[1] Daniel J Bernstein. "cache-timing attacks on aes". Citeseer, 2005.
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[2] Qian Ge, Yuval Yarom, David Cock, and Gernot Heiser. "a survey of microarchitectural timing attacks and countermeasures on contemporary hardware". Journal of Cryptographic Engineering, 8(1):1–27, 2018.
2
[3] Colin Percival. "cache missing for fun and profit". BSDCan, 2005.
3
[4] Yuval Yarom and Katrina Falkner. "FLUSH+RELOAD: A High Resolution, Low Noise, L3 Cache Side-Channel Attack". In Kevin Fu and Jaeyeon Jung, editors, 23rd USENIX Security Symposium, pages 719–732. USENIX Association, 2014.
4
[5] Eyal Ronen, Robert Gillham, Daniel Genkin, Adi Shamir, David Wong, and Yuval Yarom. "the 9 lives of bleichenbacher’s cat: New cache attacks on tls implementations". In 2019 IEEE Symposium on Security and Privacy (SP), pages 435–452. IEEE, 2019.
5
[6] Gorka Irazoqui, Mehmet Sinan Inci, Thomas Eisenbarth, and Berk Sunar. "wait a minute! a fast, cross-vm attack on aes". In International Workshop on Recent Advances in Intrusion Detection, pages 299–319. Springer, 2014.
6
[7] Berk Gülmezoğlu, Mehmet Sinan Inci, Gorka Irazoqui, Thomas Eisenbarth, and Berk Sunar. "a faster and more realistic flush+ reload attack on aes". In International Workshop on Constructive Side-Channel Analysis and Secure Design, pages 111–126. Springer, 2015.
7
[8] Daniel Gruss, Clémentine Maurice, Klaus Wagner, and Stefan Mangard. "flush+ flush: a fast and stealthy cache attack". In International Conference on Detection of Intrusions and Malware, and Vulnerability Assessment, pages 279– 299. Springer, 2016.
8
[9] Paul C Kocher. "timing attacks on implementations of diffie-hellman, rsa, dss, and other systems". In Annual International Cryptology Conference, pages 104–113. Springer, 1996.
9
[10] Dag Arne Osvik, Adi Shamir, and Eran Tromer. "cache attacks and countermeasures: the case of aes". pages 1–20, 2006.
10
[11] Thomas Ristenpart, Eran Tromer, Hovav Shacham, and Stefan Savage. "hey, you, get off of my cloud: exploring information leakage in thirdparty compute clouds". In Proceedings of the 16th ACM conference on Computer and communications security, pages 199–212. ACM, 2009.
11
[12] David Gullasch, Endre Bangerter, and Stephan Krenn. "cache games–bringing access-based cache attacks on aes to practice". In 2011 IEEE Symposium on Security and Privacy, pages 490– 505. IEEE, 2011.
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[13] Gorka Irazoqui Apecechea, Mehmet Sinan Inci, Thomas Eisenbarth, and Berk Sunar. "fine grain cross-vm attacks on xen and vmware are possible!". volume 2014, page 248. Citeseer, 2014.
13
[14] Yuval Yarom and Naomi Benger. "recovering openssl ecdsa nonces using the flush+ reload cache side-channel attack". volume 2014, page 140, 2014.
14
[15] Fangfei Liu, Yuval Yarom, Qian Ge, Gernot Heiser, and Ruby B Lee. "last-level cache sidechannel attacks are practical". In 2015 IEEE Symposium on Security and Privacy, pages 605– 622. IEEE, 2015.
15
[16] Leon Groot Bruinderink, Andreas Hülsing, Tanja Lange, and Yuval Yarom. "flush, gauss, and reload–a cache attack on the bliss lattice-based signature scheme". In International Conference on Cryptographic Hardware and Embedded Systems, pages 323–345. Springer, 2016.
16
[17] Moritz Lipp, Michael Schwarz, Daniel Gruss, Thomas Prescher, Werner Haas, Stefan Mangard, Paul Kocher, Daniel Genkin, Yuval Yarom, and Mike Hamburg. "meltdown". arXiv preprint arXiv:1801.01207, 2018.
17
[18] Michael Schwarz, Moritz Lipp, Daniel Moghimi, Jo Van Bulck, Julian Stecklina, Thomas Prescher, and Daniel Gruss. "zombieload: Cross-privilegeboundary data sampling". In Proceedings of the 2019 ACM SIGSAC Conference on Computer and Communications Security, pages 753–768, 2019.
18
[19] Paul Kocher, Jann Horn, Anders Fogh, Daniel Genkin, Daniel Gruss, Werner Haas, Mike Hamburg, Moritz Lipp, Stefan Mangard, Thomas Prescher, et al. "spectre attacks: Exploiting speculative execution". In 2019 IEEE Symposium on Security and Privacy (SP), pages 1–19. IEEE, 2019.
19
[20] Michael Schwarz, Robert Schilling, Florian Kargl, Moritz Lipp, Claudio Canella, and Daniel Gruss. "context: Leakage-free transient execution". arXiv preprint arXiv:1905.09100, 2019.
20
[21] Marina Minkin, Daniel Moghimi, Moritz Lipp, Michael Schwarz, Jo Van Bulck, Daniel Genkin, Daniel Gruss, Frank Piessens, Berk Sunar, and Yuval Yarom. "fallout: Reading kernel writes from user space". arXiv preprint arXiv:1905.12701, 2019.
21
[22] Stephan van Schaik, Alyssa Milburn, Sebastian Österlund, Pietro Frigo, Giorgi Maisuradze, Kaveh Razavi, Herbert Bos, and Cristiano Giuffrida. "ridl: Rogue in-flight data load". S&P (May 2019), 2019.
22
[23] Michael Schwarz, Martin Schwarzl, Moritz Lipp, Jon Masters, and Daniel Gruss. "netspectre: Read arbitrary memory over network". In European Symposium on Research in Computer Security, pages 279–299. Springer, 2019.
23
[24] Mathy Vanhoef and Eyal Ronen. "dragonblood: Analyzing the dragonfly handshake of wpa3 and eap-pwd". In Proceedings of the 2020 IEEE Symposium on Security and Privacy-S&P 2020). IEEE, 2020.
24
[25] Samira Briongos, Pedro Malagón, Juan-Mariano de Goyeneche, and Jose M Moya. "cache misses and the recovery of the full aes 256 key". Applied Sciences, 9(5):944, 2019.
25
ORIGINAL_ARTICLE
A Fast Publicly Verifiable Secret Sharing Scheme using Non-homogeneous Linear Recursions
A non-interactive (t,n)-publicly veriable secret sharing scheme (non-interactive (t,n)-PVSS scheme) is a (t,n)-secret sharing scheme in which anyone, not only the participants of the scheme, can verify the correctness of the produced shares without interacting with the dealer and participants. The (t,n)-PVSS schemes have found a lot of applications in cryptography because they are suitable for real-life scenarios in which an external verifier is required to check the correctness of the produced shares without interacting with the dealer and participants. In this paper, we propose a non-interactive (t,n)-PVSS scheme using the non-homogeneous linear recursions (NHLRs), and prove its security with a formal method. We compare the computational complexity of our scheme with that of Schoenmakers's scheme and show that our non-interactive (t,n)-PVSS scheme runs faster than Schoenmakers's scheme when n > 5 and n> t >(2n+9)/n. The communicational complexity of our scheme is almost equal to that of Schoenmakers's scheme.
https://www.isecure-journal.com/article_110236_726e9e11325c8ca9cbd606fa74034626.pdf
2020-07-01
91
99
10.22042/isecure.2020.212763.505
Cryptography
Secret Sharing
Verifiable Secret sharing
Publicly verifiable secret sharing
Threshold access structures
Non-homogeneous linear recursions
Ali
Zaghian
a_zaghian@mut-es.ac.ir
1
Department of Applied Mathematics and Cryptography, Malek Ashtar University of Technology, Isfahan, Iran.
LEAD_AUTHOR
Bagher
Bagherpour
bagher.bagherpour1368@gmail.com
2
Department of Applied Mathematics and Cryptography, Malek Ashtar University of Technology.
AUTHOR
[1] Bagher Bagherpour, Ali Zaghian and Mahdi Sajadieh, Sigma protocols for faster proof of simultaneous homomorphism relations, IET information security, pages 508–514, 2019.
1
[2] Norman L Biggs, Discrete Mathematics, revised ed, Oxford University Press, New York, 1989. [3] George R Blakley, Safeguarding cryptographic keys, International Workshop on Managing Requirements Knowledge, pages 313–317, 1979.
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[4] David Chaum and Torben P Pedersen, Wallet databases with observers, In: Advances in Cryptology–CRYPTO ’92, Lecture Notes in Computer Science, vol. 740, pages 89–105, Springer, Berlin, 1992.
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[5] Benny Chor, Shafi Goldwasser, Silvio Micali and Baruch Awerbuch, Verifiable secret sharing and achieving simultaneity in the presence of faults, FOCS’ 85, IEEE Computer Society, Washington, pages 383–395, 1985.
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[6] Massoud H Dehkordi and Samaneh Mashhadi, New efficient and practical verifiable multi-secret sharing schemes, Information Science, 178, pages 2262–2274, 2008.
5
[7] Massoud H Dehkordi and Samaneh Mashhadi, An efficient threshold verifiable multi-secret sharing, Computer Standards and Interfaces, 30, pages 187–190, 2008.
6
[8] Paul Feldman, A practical scheme for noninteractive verifiable secret sharing, FOCS’ 87, IEEE computer society, Washington, pages 427– 437, 1987.
7
[9] Amos Fiat and Adi Shamir, How to prove yourself: practical solutions to identification and signature problems, Advances in Cryptology-CRYPTO’86, Lecture notes in compute science, 263, pages 186– 194, Springer, Berlin, 1986.
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[10] Yuanju Gan, Lihua Wang, Ping Pan and Yixian Yang, publicly verifiable secret sharing scheme with provable security against chosen secret attacks, International journal of distributed sensor and networks, pages 1–9, 2013.
9
[11] Somayeh Heidarvand and Jorge L Villar, Public verifiability of pairings in secret sharing schemes, SAC 2008, pages 294–308, 2009.
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[12] Amir Herzberg, Stanislaw Jarecki, Hugo Krawczyk and Moti Yung, Proactive secret sharing or How to cope with perpetual leakage, CRYPTO’95, LNCS 963, pages 339–359, Springer-Verlag, 1995.
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[13] Chunqiang Hu, Xiaofeng Liao and Xiuzhen Cheng, Verifiable multi-secret sharing based on LFSR sequences, Theoretical Computer Science, 445, pages 52–62, 2012.
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[14] Mahabir P Jhanwar, Ayineedi Venkateswarlu and Reihaneh Safavi-Naini, Paillier-based publicly verifiable (non-interactive) secret sharing, Designs, codes and Cryptography, 18 March 2014.
13
[15] Mahabir P Jhanwar, A practical (non-interactive) publicly verifiable secret sharing scheme, LNCS 6672, pages 273–287, 2011.
14
[16] Yanhong Liu, Futai Zhang and Jie Zhang, Attacks to some verifiable multi-secret sharing schemes and two improved schemes, Information Science, 329, pages 524–539, 2016.
15
[17] Samaneh Mashhadi, Secure publicly verifiable and proactive secret sharing schemes with general access structures, Information Science, 378, pages 99–108, 2017.
16
[18] Silvio Micali, Fair public-key cryptosystems, Advances in Cryptology-CRYPTO 1992, Lecture Notes in Computer Science, vol. 740, pages 113– 138, Springer, Berlin, 1993.
17
[19] Torben P Pedersen, Non-interactive and Information-Theoretic Secure Verifiable secret sharing, Advances in Cryptology-CRYPTO’91 , pages 129–140, 1992.
18
[20] Alexandre Ruiz and Jorge L Villar, Publicly verifiable secret sharing from paillier’s cryptosystem, WEWORC 2005, LNI p-74, pages 98–108, 2005.
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[21] Adi Shamir, How to share a secret, Communications of the ACM, 22, pages 612–613. 1979.
20
[22] Berry Schoenmakers, A simple publicly verifiable secret sharing scheme and its application to electronic voting, Advances in CryptologyCRYPTO’99, Lecture Notes in Computer Science, pages 148–164, vol. 1666, Springer, Berlin, 1999.
21
[23] Jun Shao and Zhenfu Cao, A new efficient (t, n) verifiable multi-secret sharing scheme based on YCH scheme, Applied Mathematics and Computation, 168, pages 135–140, 2005. [24] Markus Stadler, Publicly verifiable secret sharing, Advances in Cryptology-EUROCRYPT’96, Lecture Notes in Computer Science, pages 190– 199, Springer, Berlin, 1996.
22
[25] Theodore M Wong, Chenxi Wang and Jeannette M Wing, Verifiable secret redistribution for archive systems, Proceedings of the first International IEEE security in storage workshop (SISW’02), 2003.
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[26] Tsu Y Wu and Yuh M Tseng, A pairing-based publicly verifiable secret sharing scheme, Journal of Systems Science and Complexity, 24, pages 186–194, 2011.
24
ORIGINAL_ARTICLE
GSLHA: Group-based Secure Lightweight Handover Authentication Protocol for M2M Communication
Machine to machine (M2M) communication, which is also known as machine type communication (MTC), is one of the most fascinating parts of mobile communication technology and also an important practical application of the Internet of Things. The main objective of this type of communication, is handling massive heterogeneous devices with low network overheads and high security guarantees. Hence, various protocols and schemes were proposed to achieve security requirements in M2M communication and reduce computational and communication costs. In this paper, we propose the group-based secure lightweight handover authentication (GSLHA) protocol for M2M communication in LTE and future 5G networks. The proposed protocol mutually authenticates a group of MTC devices (MTCDs) and a new eNodeB (eNB) when these simultaneously enter the coverage of the eNB with considering all the cellular network requirements. The security analysis and formal verification by using the AVISPA tool show that the protocol has been able to achieve all the security goals and overcome various attacks. In addition, the comparative performance analysis of the handover authentication protocols shows that the proposed protocol has the best computational and communication overheads.
https://www.isecure-journal.com/article_107963_6c1e8752d714260d262091edad671f32.pdf
2020-07-01
101
111
10.22042/isecure.2020.213482.507
IoT
Network Security
M2M communication
Group-based handover authentication
AVISPA
Mohammad
Modiri
m.modiri96@student.sharif.edu
1
Department of Electrical Engineering, Sharif University of Technology
LEAD_AUTHOR
Javad
Mohajeri
mohajer@sharif.edu
2
Sharif University of Technology,
AUTHOR
Mahmoud
Salmasizadeh
salmasi@sharif.edu
3
Electronic Research Institute, Sharif University of Technology, Tehran, Iran
AUTHOR
[1] Nancy L. Russo and Jeanette Eriksson. The Internet of Things and People in Health Care. Internet of Things A to Z, page 447–474, 2018.
1
[2] Sławomir Żółkiewski and Krzysztof Galuszka. Remote Control of Industry Robots Using Mobile Devices. New Contributions in Information SystemsandTechnologiesAdvancesinIntelligent Systems and Computing, page 323–332, 2015.
2
[3] BaluL.Parne,ShubhamGupta,andNarendraS. Chaudhari. SEGB: Security Enhanced Group Based AKA Protocol for M2M Communication in an IoT Enabled LTE/LTE-A Network. IEEE Access, 6:3668–3684, 2018.
3
[4] 3rd Generation Partnership Project, “Techni Figure A.3. The role of the TeNB. cal Specification Group Services and System Aspects; 3GPP System Architecture Evolution (SAE)” 3GPP TS 33.401 V15.2.0 , Jan. 2018.
4
[5] 3rd Generation Partnership Project, “Technical Specification Group Radio Access Network,” Evolved Universal Terrestrial Radio Access (EUTRA) and Evolved Universal Terrestrial Radio Access Network (E-UTRAN); (Rel 13), 2016, 3GPP TS 36.300 V13.4.0.
5
[6] Technical Specification Group Services and System Aspects; Security Aspects of Machine-Type Communications (MTC) (Release 11), document 3GPP TR 33.868 Vo.7.0, 3GPP, Valbonne, France, 2012.
6
[7] Muhammad Burhan, Rana Rehman, Bilal Khan, and Byung-Seo Kim. IoT Elements, Layered Architectures and Security Issues: A Comprehensive Survey. Sensors, 18(9):2796, 2018.
7
[8] Jin Cao, Hui Li, and Maode Ma. GAHAP: A group-based anonymity handover authentication protocol for MTC in LTE-A networks. 2015 IEEE International Conference on Communications (ICC), 2015.
8
[9] Jin Cao, Hui Li, Maode Ma, and Fenghua Li. UGHA: Uniform group-based handover authentication for MTC within E-UTRAN in LTE-A networks. 2015 IEEE International Conference on Communications (ICC), 2015.
9
[10] Qinglei Kong, Rongxing Lu, Shuo Chen, and Hui Zhu. Achieve Secure Handover Session Key ManagementviaMobileRelayinLTE-Advanced Networks. IEEE Internet of Things Journal, page 1–1, 2016.
10
[11] Jin Cao, Hui Li, Maode Ma, and Fenghua Li. UPPGHA: Uniform Privacy Preservation Group HandoverAuthenticationMechanismformMTC in LTE-A Networks. Security and Communication Networks, 2018:1–16, 2018.
11
[12] Mohammad Mahdi Modiri, Javad Mohajeri, and Mahmoud Salmasizadeh. GSL-AKA: Groupbased Secure Lightweight Authentication and Key Agreement Protocol for M2M Communication. 2018 9th International Symposium on Telecommunications (IST), 2018.
12
[13] Mourad Abdeljebbar and Rachid Elkouch. Security analysis of LTE/SAE networks over EUTRAN. 2016 International Conference on Information Technology for Organizations Development (IT4OD), 2016.
13
[14] 3rd Generation Partnership Project (3GPP) TS 33.501, “Technical Specification Group Services and System Aspects; Security architecture and procedures for 5G system”,V.15.0.0, March 2018.
14
[15] Jin Cao, Hui Li, Maode Ma, Yueyu Zhang, and Chengzhe Lai. A simple and robust handover authentication between HeNB and eNB in LTE networks. Computer Networks, 56(8):2119–2131, 2012.
15
ORIGINAL_ARTICLE
F-STONE: A Fast Real-Time DDOS Attack Detection Method Using an Improved Historical Memory Management
Distributed Denial of Service (DDoS) is a common attack in recent years that can deplete the bandwidth of victim nodes by flooding packets. Based on the type and quantity of traffic used for the attack and the exploited vulnerability of the target, DDoS attacks are grouped into three categories as Volumetric attacks, Protocol attacks and Application attacks. The volumetric attack, which the proposed method attempts to detect it, is the most common type of DDoS attacks. The aim of this paper is to reduce the delay of real-time detection of DDoS attacks utilizing hybrid structures based on data stream algorithms. The proposed data structure (BHM ) improves the data storing mechanism presented in STONE method and consequently reduces the detection time. STONE characterizes regular network traffic of a service by aggregating it into common prefixes of IP addresses, and detecting attacks when the aggregated traffic deviates from the regular one. In BHM, history refers to the output traffic information obtained from each monitoring period to form a reference profile. The reference profile is created by employing historical information and only includes normal traffic information. The delay of DDoS attack detection increases in STONE due to long-time intervals between each monitoring period. The proposed method (F-STONE) has been compared to STONE based on attack detection time, Expected Profile Update Time (EPUT), and rate of attack detection. The evaluation results indicated significant improvements in terms of the EPUT, acceleration of attack detection and reduction of false positive rate.
https://www.isecure-journal.com/article_107959_bf49f140f7f9e82841dd4f64c81f6a5e.pdf
2020-07-01
113
128
10.22042/isecure.2020.167450.453
DDoS detection
Real time detection
Data stream algorithm
Binary-mapped Historical-memory Management
Anomaly Detection
Expected Profile Update Time
Mahsa
Nooribakhsh
nooribakhsh@buiniau.ac.ir
1
Department of Computer, Buinzahra branch, Islamic Azad University, Buinzahra, Iran
AUTHOR
Mahdi
Mollamotalebi
motalebi@qiau.ac.ir
2
Department of Computer, Buinzahra branch, Islamic Azad University, Buinzahra, Iran
LEAD_AUTHOR
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ORIGINAL_ARTICLE
Attribute-based Access Control for Cloud-based Electronic Health Record (EHR) Systems
Electronic health record (EHR) system facilitates integrating patients' medical information and improves service productivity. However, user access to patient data in a privacy-preserving manner is still challenging problem. Many studies concerned with security and privacy in EHR systems. Rezaeibagha and Mu [1] have proposed a hybrid architecture for privacy-preserving accessing patient records in a cloud system. In their scheme, encrypted EHRs are stored in multiple clouds to provide scalability and privacy. In addition, they considered a role-based access control (RBAC) such that for any user, an EHR access policy must be determined. They also encrypt the EHRs by the public keys of all users. So, for a large amount of EHRs, this scheme is not efficient. Furthermore, using RBAC for access policy makes the policy changing difficult. In their scheme, users cannot search on encrypted EHRs based on diseases and some physicians must participate in the data retrieval by a requester physician. In this paper, we address these problems by considering a ciphertext-policy attribute-based encryption (CP-ABE) which is conceptually closer to the traditional access control methods such as RBAC. Our secure scheme can retrieve encrypted EHR based on a specific disease. Furthermore, the proposed scheme guarantees the user access control and the anonymity of the user or data owner during data retrieval. Moreover, our scheme is resistant against collusion between unauthorized retrievers to access the data. The analysis shows that our scheme is secure and efficient for cloud-based EHRs.
https://www.isecure-journal.com/article_107962_9c0411a9bfb27771d658c2b9beab2271.pdf
2020-07-01
129
140
10.22042/isecure.2020.174338.458
Access Control
Electronic health record
Attribute-Based Encryption
EHR
Cloud Storage
Maryam
Zarezadeh
maryam.zarezadeh@gmail.com
1
Department of Information Technology Engineering, University of Isfahan, Isfahan, Iran
AUTHOR
Maede
Ashouri-Talouki
m.ashouri@eng.ui.ac.ir
2
Department of Information Technology Engineering, Faculty of Computer Engineering, University of Isfahan
LEAD_AUTHOR
Mohammad
Siavashi
m.siavashi@cse.shiraz.ac.ir
3
2Department of Computer Science and Engineering, Shiraz University, Shiraz, Iran
AUTHOR
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